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SUSPENSE

Remarks:

Jim:

Thanks for another fine performance.

DCI/DDCK

8 OCT 1976

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

MACFARLANE, FERGUSON, ALLISON & KELLY

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW

Approved For Release 2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002700100007-5

2910 FIRST FINANCIAL TOWER
P. O. BOX 1531

TAMPA, FLORIDA 33601

PHONE (813) 223-2411

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PHONE (904) 224-1215

CABLE ADDRESS "MACFAK"

September 29, 1976

STATINTL

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H. JACKSON
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OMAS ALEXANDER
1966
WARD P. MACFARLANE
1967
HERNDON HANSBROUGH
1972
PANK BEZONI
1972
JOHN M. ALLISON
1976

CHESTER H. FERGUSON
T. PAINE KELLY, JR.
ARTHUR W. SIMPSON
D. A. ALLEN
HUGH C. MACFARLANE
GEORGE W. ERICKSEN
CHARLES F. CLARK
J. DANFORTH BROWNE
BEAVAN WOODWARD
DAVID J. KADYK
M. W. GRAYBILL
EDWARD J. KOHRS
DAVID C. G. KERR
JOHN A. CURTISS
BROOKS P. HOYT
CHARLIE LUCKIE, JR.
JAMES B. MCDONOUGH, JR.
STANLEY W. ROSENKRANZ
JAMES A. BAXTER
RICHARD R. CROOKE
JOHN R. BUSH
LAWRENCE J. O'NEIL
CHARLES W. PITTMAN
JOHN C. BIERLEY
JEREMY P. ROSS
JACK C. RINARD
NATHAN B. SIMPSON
H. VANCE SMITH
STEPHEN H. SEARS
RICHARD D. SENTRY
EARNEST W. DEAN, JR.
TED R. MANRY, III
STEPHEN H. REYNOLDS
THOMAS W. RUGGLES

STELLA FERGUSON THAYER
E. JOHN DINKEL, III
GEORGE L. BROWN, JR.
HOWELL L. FERGUSON
MERCER FEARINGTON
PHILIP S. PARSONS
JAMES E. BLOODWORTH
ANSLEY WATSON, JR.
RICHARD A. VALERI
JOHN F. RUDY, II
THOMAS B. MIMMS, JR.
LAURENCE E. KINSOLVING
WILLIAM BARRETT TAYLOR, IV
JERRY L. NEWMAN
WILLIAM E. HAHN
ROBERT G. COCHRAN
JAMES CRAIG DELESIE, SR.
JEFFREY W. WARREN
KENNETH L. WEISS
DAVID F. POPE
HAMILTON H. WHALEY
CLAUDE H. TISON, JR.
JOSEPH I. YOUAKIM
JOHN W. CAMPBELL
STEPHEN L. PANKAU
MARY L. TAYLOR
D. SCOTT DOUGLAS

Executive Registry

76-3641

IN REPLY REFER TO:
John C. Bierley
Tampa, Florida

As Secretary of the Tampa Bay Area Committee on Foreign Relations, I want to thank you so very much for your superlative discussion at our recent meeting.

I think that it was very interesting for our members to see the mental process that an intelligence officer utilizes in analyzing a given factual situation. This was very different from any other speaker that I can recall that we have hosted over the past year.

I want to encourage the CIA to allow persons at your level to speak to groups such as ours for two reasons. One reason is that just mentioned, it is not possible for generalists and untrained individuals to give the same sort of explanation that you delivered to us. The second reason is that very few American citizens in the ordinary run of domestic life have an opportunity to meet a member of the CIA. I think that it is good for our citizenry, particularly decision makers (such as those that compose our committees), to meet a CIA agent first-hand. Through this they gain understanding that the day-to-day activities of the organization and its personnel are far removed from the "James Bond" type of characterization that is so amply depicted in the mass media.

Thank you again for your presentation.

Sincerely yours,

John C. Bierley

STATINTL

JCB/ejo

cc: Mr. George Bush, Director

Approved For Release 2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002700100007-5
Central Intelligence Agency

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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions

(40)

Paul Oliver

121 AUG 20 1979

21 September 1976


Executive Registry
76-5283

DCI,

We have a request from Mr. Barry Berman, Connecticut State Radio Network for a three minute telephone interview with you on the occasion of Nathan Hale Day. The request is based on the connection between you as DCI and you as a son of Connecticut.

We see no objection to your doing the interview; you might wish to consider using some of the attached in your responses.

If you agree, we will proceed to make the arrangements with the expectation that the interview ^{STATINTL} might be done sometime after 4:00 p.m. today.


Andrew Falkiewicz

Telephone Statement for Mr. Barry Berman, Connecticut
Radio Network, on 200th Anniversary of Nathan Hale's
Hanging

Mr. Berman, I am indeed aware that the 22nd of September is the 200th anniversary of the heroic death of Nathan Hale, and I think it is entirely fitting that the people of Connecticut, along with the rest of the American people, are remembering this gallant man of our revolutionary days. You may not be aware that we have a statue of Nathan Hale here on the grounds of CIA in Washington -- a tribute to the sacrifice he made as one of America's first intelligence officer.

You may remember that Nathan Hale -- in explaining to a fellow officer why he decided to accept a dangerous intelligence mission -- said that such service was honorable because it was necessary for the public good. I'm pleased to say that today there are still many young American men and women serving their country in the intelligence field who feel the same way, and are at this very moment serving their country here and abroad.

Of course, the nature of intelligence has changed dramatically since 1776, and many of our dedicated people today are highly educated with advanced academic degrees. It's not just that the collection of intelligence has become vastly more complicated, but an important aspect today is

the painstaking research and analysis we do to provide senior officials and policymakers with the best intelligence possible on what's going on around the world.

At least one version of how Nathan Hale was identified as a British spy is that someone failed to keep his secret. Intelligence secrets are just as vital today if we at CIA are to do our job. The "leaking" of intelligence information to the press and the exposure of our people abroad and those who aid them is a continuing concern to us. We have, Mr. Berman, an intelligence capability second to none in the world -- and you can be assured we intend to maintain it.

CAPTAIN NATHAN HALE

June 6, 1755, Coventry, Connecticut--
September 22, 1776, New York City

During the first week of September 1776, in response to General Washington's requirements for increased intelligence, a partisan unit, "Knowlton's Rangers," was established to serve as the "eyes of the Army"--to conduct scouting and reconnaissance in, about and behind enemy lines. The unit, comprised of hand-picked volunteers from other units, had as one of its company commanders, Captain Nathan Hale, who had distinguished himself in May in leading the capture of an enemy supply ship from under the guns of the British warship, Asia.

In mid-September, Captain Hale accepted, voluntarily, an intelligence mission behind enemy lines. In explaining his decision to a fellow officer, Captain (later General) William Hull, Hale said:

"I am fully sensible of the consequences of discovery and capture...I am not influenced by the expectation of promotion or pecuniary reward; I wish to be useful, and every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious."

A British orderly book of September 22, 1776, records the bitter end of Hale's mission: "A Spy from the Enemy (by his own full Confession) Apprehended Last Night, was this day executed at 11 o'clock in front of the Artillery Park."

On the evening of September 22nd, Captain John Montross of the British Engineers, aide-de-camp to Lord Howe, appeared under a flag of truce at the American outpost at Harlem Heights. There, he advised Alexander Hamilton, Captain Hull and General Putnam, that Nathan Hale had been executed that morning as a spy. Hale, he said, had successfully passed through the British Army and had made sketches of British fortifications and had made notes of their number and location. Hale was sentenced to death, without trial, and at the gallows--according to Montross, he made "a sensible and spirited speech," concluding with the words:

"I regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."

Another officer witnessing Hale's death, recorded in his diary that Captain Hale had "behaved with great composure and resolution."

From other sources it was learned that Hale had been successful in his mission and had exfiltrated to a point only three miles of the American lines when he was captured by Roger's Rangers--whose commander Robert Rogers, famed for his Northwest Passage exploits, was charged with apprehension of enemy scouts and agents during the engagement. Hale's cover story, that of a Dutch school-

taken into British custody. But then, either through betrayal by a kinsman, or as a result of the body search which uncovered his notes, in Latin, and the maps, concealed in the sole of his shoe, his true purpose was discovered and he admitted his name and rank in the American Army.

Few American officers of the period had intelligence training or experience, and it has been said that by the example of Captain Hale, General Washington assured that in the future, American agents were properly "schooled" in intelligence before embarking on their missions. As American experience with intelligence developed, the full range of intelligence techniques developed--safe houses, secret writing, "drops" or concealment devices and locations, secret signals, and the like, all created to protect the security of the American agent.

J.S. Babcock said it in 1844:

He fell in the spring of his early prime,
With his fair hopes all around him;
He died for his birth-land — "a glorious crime" —
Ere the palm of his fame had crowned him.

He fell in her darkness—he lived not to see
The morn of her risen glory;
But the name of the brave, in the hearts of the free,
Shall be twined in her deathless story.

It has been said that Hale lies buried in an unknown grave near the site of his execution. John MacMullen reminded us in 1858:

We know not where they buried him,
Belike beneath the tree,
But patriot memories cluster there,
Where'er the spot may be.
Yes! Youthful martyr! All our isle
To us more sacred's made,
Since on her breast thy manly form
In death's deep sleep was laid.

P. Affairs
Executive Registry

76-8904/2

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

September 21, 1976

OTHR

Mr. and Mrs. E. F. Knoche

Dear Al and Timmie:

I certainly enjoyed the opportunity to get to know so many members of the Supreme Emblem Club and, in particular, to make Timmie's acquaintance. To run into another with the same last name as ours is rare enough. To find the name pronounced the same is even rarer.

I was, indeed, sorry to hear about Al's misfortune, but the prognosis was a good one. I look forward to the time when I can meet him as I did Timmie.

In the meantime, best of everything to you both. Onward and upward.

Faithfully yours,

E. H. Knoche


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EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

Public Affairs

P. Affinis
6 Aug



THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

September 21, 1976

Ms. Lucile Johnson
Supreme President
265 West 20th
Eugene, Oregon 97405

Dear Lucile:

What a warm and moving occasion it was for me to meet you and your sister colleagues in the Supreme Emblem Club and to speak at the convention on the occasion of the 50th anniversary.

As I indicated in my opening remarks, the dedication, devotion, and patriotism of your great organization is matched, I hope, by the same traits in ours at CIA.

May your 51st convention in Honolulu next year be as successful as the 50th in San Francisco. And, may the new President, Camron, be as successful as you were in your year at the helm.

All the best to you and keep in touch. And, as always, onward and upward.

Faithfully yours,

E. H. Knoche

STATINT

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2 - DDCI
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Remarks:

If you wish, we can answer this letter if you provide us with the info needed in paragraph 2.

Margaret
O/ADCI

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Approved For Release 2001/4/20 : CIA-RDP79M00467A0027001

76-8904



Supreme Organizer
 MRS. HOMER (NADINE) SCOTT
 Box 353
 White Salmon, Washington 98672

Supreme Corresponding Secretary
 Mrs. JOHN (MARJORIE) STEARNS
 1113 Balboa Street
 Eugene, Oregon 97401

Supreme Emblem Club of the United States of America

Supreme Chairman of Laws
 MRS. SCOTT (JEANENE) SWAGGERTY, P.S.P.
 3004 Altura Avenue
 La Crescenta, California 91214

Supreme Executive Secretary
 Mrs. JOHN J. (BEA) GRIZIANO, P.S.P.
 374 Orient Way
 Rutherford, New Jersey 07070

Supreme President
 LUCILE JOHNSON
 265 West 20th
 Eugene, Oregon 97405

August 6, 1976

Mr. Andrew T. Falkiewicz,
 Assistant to the Director of the
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Falkiewicz:

Our Supreme President, Lucile Johnson, has asked me to thank you for your letter of July 19, 1976. She is delighted and honored to learn that your Deputy Director, E. Henry Knocke will be the guest speaker at the Emblem Club Supreme Banquet at the San Francisco-Hilton Hotel, September 16, 1976.

She would like to inform you that there will be a suite reserved for Mr. Knocke for that night at the San Francisco-Hilton Hotel, and arrangements will be made, if necessary, to meet his plane, if she can be informed as to how and when he will be arriving. It would also be helpful in planning the seating at the head table, if we knew whether or not he will be accompanied by his wife.

Thank you again for this honor. We shall be looking forward with pleasure to meeting and hearing Mr. Knocke.

Very truly yours,

Marjorie Stearns
 Marjorie Stearns,
 Supreme Corresponding Secretary

cc: DDCI 8/12/76

Pub. Affs.

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Remarks:

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

Executive Registry

76-10089

20 SEP 1976

Editor
Washington Post
1150 15th St. NW
Washington, DC 20005

Sir:

Your editorial on Sunday, September 19 (*George Bush and the Old Boy Net*) totally missed the point I had made on various occasions regarding "risk of disclosure".

My point is simply this: I do not think that it is right for an individual member or staff of one of our seven Congressional Oversight Committees -- any more than for a member of the Executive Branch -- to take upon himself publicly to disclose and thus destroy a covert action that has been properly authorized and briefed in accordance with legal, statutory, and administrative procedures now in effect.

I do favor consolidated Congressional oversight. As opposed to reporting to seven Committees of the Congress (I have made more than 35 official appearances before Congress in seven and one-half months as Director of Central Intelligence), personally, I would like to see a Joint Intelligence Committee with representation from both House and Senate and with full but exclusive oversight responsibility.

In the meantime, I am cooperating fully with the various Congressional Committees, and I will continue to do so. At the same time I will speak out against unauthorized disclosure -- against the "leaks" that endanger the lives of people and abort properly determined programs.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY

One final word: You know very well that not so many months ago there was a wholly adversary relationship between some in the Congress and the CIA. As I said in my remarks to the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, there continues to be a proper determination on the part of the Congress to see that the CIA lives within the law; to this end also the CIA is bound by Presidential direction and internal administrative procedures. At present, however, the inquiries conducted by the Senate Intelligence Committee and other Committees, provided they are not exploited for sensational publicity, are thorough and designed to strengthen our intelligence capacity while safeguarding the rights of American citizens. I think that is good for our country.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush
Director

AFalkiewicz:mb 20 Sept retyped

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Executive Registry

76-10089

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Remarks:

LF: I have asked
OLC to take a look
at this & advise.
Frankly I think it
needs a major re-write.

STATINTL

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FORM NO.
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For review + comment
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20 Sep.

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76-10089

Editor
Washington Post
1150 15th St. NW
Washington, DC 20005

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I do favor consolidated Congressional oversight. As opposed to reporting to seven Committees of the Congress (I have made more than 35 official appearances before Congress in seven and one-half months as Director of Central Intelligence), I think the Senate Intelligence Committee can and should be the forerunner of such consolidation. Personally, I would like to see a Joint Intelligence Committee with representation from both House and Senate and with full oversight responsibility.

In the meantime I am cooperating fully with the various Congressional Committees, and I will continue to do so. At the same time I will speak out against unauthorized disclosure -- against the "leaks" that endanger the lives of people and abort properly determined programs.

One final word: You know very well that not so many months ago there was a wholly adversary relationship between some in the Congress and the CIA. As I said in my remarks to the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, there continues to be a proper determination on the part of the Congress to see that the CIA lives within the law; to this end also the CIA is bound by Presidential direction and internal administrative procedures. At present, however, the inquiries conducted by the Senate Intelligence Committee and other Committees, provided they are not exploited for sensational publicity, are thorough and designed to result in legislation, if necessary, that will strengthen our intelligence capacity while safeguarding the rights of American citizens. I think that is good for our country.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

AFalkiewicz:mb 20 Sept 1976

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TINTL

Sept 19, 1976

WASHINGTON POST

George Bush and the Old Boy Net

WHEN GEORGE BUSH was under examination by the Senate for confirmation in his present post as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, some concern was expressed about his lack of experience in the intelligence business. True, he had previously been ambassador to the United Nations and had just given up his post as U.S. representative to the People's Republic of China. But he had also been, not to put too fine a point on it, political. He had been chairman of the Republican National Committee and had run for the Senate after serving as a member of the House of Representatives from Texas. Apart from the question of whether a once-practicing politician was quite right for the job of CIA director, there was worry about how he would fit in.

Well, the answer seems to be that he is fitting in just fine, judging from some remarks he made the other day at a gathering of retired intelligence officers. In fact, he sounded like a charter member of what might be called the CIA's "old boy net." The agency, he reported proudly, had "weathered the storm" of congressional investigation that had swept over it in the last three years. "The mood in Congress is changed," he went on to say. "No one is campaigning against strong intelligence. . . . The adversary thing, how we can ferret out corruption, has given way to the more serious question of how we can get better intelligence." There is, however, still one problem, Mr. Bush reported, according to an account of his remarks in this newspaper. No fewer than seven congressional committees now must be alerted in "timely fashion" to impending CIA covert operations, under a new and stricter system of oversight that replaces the cozy, intimate and demonstrably ineffective arrangements that allowed the agency to run amok for more than two decades. And the result of closer oversight, the CIA director complained, is that "now, weight is given to the risk of disclosure" before the agency intervenes one way or another in the internal affairs of foreign countries as agent of the government and, by extension, the people of the United States.

We think Mr. Bush is right on one point: The mood of Congress has changed. But we part company with him on his reading of what has happened to congressional attitudes toward the CIA. For the change, in our view, has very little to do with the pros and cons of "strong intelligence"—very few, if any, members of Congress

were ever "campaigning" against that. And if Mr. Bush thinks they were—or that the congressional investigations were some "adversary thing" to "ferret out corruption"—then the lesson of the last three years has been lost on him. It was not corruption but atrocities and abuse of power and the wholesale repudiation of fundamental values and principles that so profoundly troubled the CIA's serious critics in Congress. And the change in Congress' mood, we suspect, derives in part from evidence that self-correction, exposure and reform have brought an end to the worst of the agency's past excesses, and in part from heightened confidence (considerably short of complete) that improved oversight will prevent those excesses from recurring.

Right there, on the question of oversight, is where we really part company with Mr. Bush. For what he sees as a bother ("now, weight must be given to the risk of disclosure"), we see as a positive blessing. We would not recommend wholesale disclosure of the details of operations that can pass the test of serious congressional oversight and that require secrecy in order to be effective. But it does strike us as not a bad idea at all for CIA officials, as they dream of projects to singe a dictator's beard, or to blow up a prime minister, or to poison a reservoir, or to buy up the legislators of some foreign land, to have to think seriously about how it would all look in public testimony before Congress. What is so wrong with their having to pause and ponder how this or that clandestine act would square with public expectations of the way the U.S. government should comport itself? This could, after all, be a means of bringing public opinion to bear, however hypothetically or subconsciously, on these sensitive and controversial activities in the formative, planning stage. And under our system that seems to us to be an altogether healthy thing.

We are disappointed that Mr. Bush apparently does not agree, because we actually were not among those who thought his political background was automatically disqualifying for the CIA directorship. On the contrary, it seemed to us at the time that a man who had sought and held elective office might be more than ordinarily sensitive to the real nature of public anxieties about the CIA. It doesn't seem to have worked out that way, which may say something about the agency's capacity for captivation that the congressional overseers ought to keep firmly in mind.